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Every law maintains an important fact: out of the political welter this doctrine has
emerged as the supreme doctrine of the new fourth Constitutional epoch. It is widely
understood that the scrutiny regime instituted by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,1 is but one
of three which have determined applications of the Constitution since its ratification. As
one historian summarizes:
At one point in its history American constitutional jurisprudence presumed that the distinction
between ‘judicial’ and ‘political’ questions was intelligible; at another point it presumed that the
boundary between public power and private rights could coherently be traced; at another it
presumed that there was a clear difference between the sort of legislation that required heightened
and the sort that only required minimal scrutiny. Those presumptions did not come from the
Constitution or any other legal source. They came from a set of shared social and political
attitudes that shaped conceptions of the role of the judiciary in American constitutionalism. As
those attitudes changed, presumptions changed with them. A robust constitutional principle of
departmental discretion gave way to judicial boundary tracing which gave way to judicially
fashioned levels of scrutiny. None of those regimes of constitutional interpretation should be
regarded as cast in stone. None should be regarded as intrinsically superior to the others. The
scrutiny regime has been with us for approximately 70 years. It may have exhausted itself as a
helpful technique of constitutional interpretation. If we understand its historical origins, perhaps
we can understand its contingent status.2

However, what is less widely known is that three recent cases illustrate how the third
epoch has ended and the concerns of the new epoch. Currently the cases are litigated in
terms of the meaning of, every, maintain and important.
Equally widely understood is the pervasive importance of maintenance in the
Court’s jurisprudence. It is one of those terms which was carried over from the prescrutiny days into the scrutiny regime, forming part of an informal Supreme Court
jurisprudence which would inevitably become part of doctrine and now, in the fourth
Constitutional epoch, has done so. In Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,3 the
Court found zoning Constitutional and not a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The
question for the Euclid Court was, whether zoning violates “‘the right of property…by
attempted regulations under the guise of the police power, which are unreasonable and
confiscatory’?”4 The Euclid Court set up certain facts as important and then sustained the
zoning law at issue (a single-family land use law) because it maintained the facts.
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Maintenance—what it is and what it maintains—is what mattered to the Court.
The Court saw housing as what was maintained in the case: “The serious question in the
case arises over the provisions of the ordinance excluding from residential districts
apartment houses, business houses, retail stores and shops, and other like establishments.
This question involves the validity of what is really the crux of the more recent zoning
legislation, namely, the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from which
business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses, are excluded.”5
Note that the Court finds zoning to be an indicium of the creation of housing. The Court
finds that the zoning law at issue “bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the
community”6—not, it bears pointing out, to a legitimate government purpose; for the
Court, “health,” “safety,” and “community” are facts, not goals or policies. That
“rational relation” means maintenance—that government must show results, not goals,
when it defends its policy—is shown when the Court approvingly cites another ruling
sustaining zoning laws which preserve facts in the face of “changing conditions.”7 We
shall see this concern in Kelo v. New London, where Justice Kennedy insists that the
“state interest” of the scrutiny regime demands an inquiry, into the past, as to facts.
So how does government show this “rational relation?” By showing that the
policy has demonstrated a “substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.”8 This test makes it clear that the Court feels that what others might feel
are “legitimate” goals—public health, safety and so on—are, perhaps, important, but the
Court is concerned with them as important facts. The Court’s question for government is,
how has the policy maintained those facts? not even, how might it maintain those facts?
The Court passes on, not what should be done—it does not assume a legislative or
executive role—but rather, on what has been done. This is consistent with approach to
housing as something which predated government policy with respect to it.
And the Court sees this as a strict test, not a lax test—we shall also see Justice
Kennedy following this up. Note that the test is neither minimum scrutiny (rational
relation to a legitimate government purpose) nor intermediate scrutiny (substantially
advances an important government purpose). It takes one criterion from each test, and
forms a test which is no part of the scrutiny regime. Of course, Euclid predates West
Coast Hotel by eleven years. Nevertheless, maintenance clearly DOES play the same
role in West Coast Hotel which it played in Euclid.
The West Coast Hotel Court sustained a minimum wage law for women and
minors, and in doing so it not only kept the concept of maintenance, but also introduced
the notion of importance. The Court sustained the law because it felt a certain wage level
was an important fact: “The importance of the question, in which many states having
similar laws are concerned, the close division by which the decision in the Adkins Case
[the earlier Supreme Court case finding minimum wage laws unconstitutional]9 was
reached, and the economic conditions which have supervened, and in the light of which
the reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power of the state must be considered,
make it not only appropriate, but we think imperative, that in deciding the present case
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the subject should receive fresh consideration.”10 In short, the wage is an important
fact.11
The law was found Constitutional because it maintains that wage. The law the
Court upheld expressly stated as fact that wages lower than the new law allowed, “were
not adequate for…maintenance,” and research serving as the basis of the law had shown
as fact, the need for wages “sufficient for…decent maintenance….”12 The Court adopted
both these usages. Thus, importance and maintenance entered the law informally.
Nevertheless, the formal adumbration of the scrutiny regime proceeded along different
lines. “Freedom of contract” had been alleged as a reason for not permitting minimum
wage laws, and Court found that this was an aspect of “an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty” and that “the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. Liberty
under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of
the community is due process.”13 Obviously, the Court skipped over many important
questions: the factual relation between contract and liberty, the meaning of “subjection,”
and the meaning of “restraints.” It is now a commonplace that it was a poor choice to
link liberty to minimum wage laws, and such a link had not been advanced by the state of
Washington, which had passed the law.14 How poor, came to be seen in Lawrence v.
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Texas,15 which found sodomy laws unconstitutional. Nevertheless, West Coast Hotel
became the foundation for what later emerged as the three levels of scrutiny: minimum
scrutiny, in which laws are found Constitutional if they are rationally related to a
legitimate state interest; intermediate scrutiny, in which laws are found Constitutional if
they substantially further an important state interest; and strict scrutiny, in which laws are
found Constitutional if they specifically fulfill an overriding state interest.
These tenets and their doctrinal basis, were overthrown by Lawrence. Here the
Court found that, in certain cases, sodomy was liberty, and found the law banning it in
these cases, unconstitutional because the law “furthers no legitimate state interest.”16
That this test may be flipped around into a mandate—and that that mandate is
maintenance—is shown by the Court’s procedure, which is that of Euclid. Regarded as a
scrutiny regime case, Euclid takes “substantial” from intermediate scrutiny and “relation”
from minimum scrutiny. Assuming there is any logical content to the scrutiny regime,
how can the Court be so cavalier? By substituting facts for goals. The Lawrence Court
does the same thing. It takes “furthers” from intermediate scrutiny and “legitimate” from
minimum scrutiny. How can it do so? By substituting liberty as a fact for liberty as a
goal (the West Coast Hotel innovation). In short, the Lawrence Court is saying that if
liberty is sustained, then it is maintained.
The Court never uses “maintain” or “maintenance” in Lawrence. How, then, do
we know that the Court is interested in reading “state interest” out of the Constitution?
By a line of cases giving increased prominence to “state interest” as a factual test. This
was in some doubt after the 1984 Midkiff zoning case, in which the Court sustained a law
and said that its “state interest” need only be “conceivable.”17 Twelve years later, a pair
of cases clarified “state interest” as a question of fact for the trier of fact. In Romer v.
Evans,18 which voided a Colorado Constitutional amendment barring any state
governmental entity from taking any action to protect homosexuals from discrimination
based on their sexual orientation, the Court said that laws must have “an independent and
legitimate legislative end….”19 That is, there must not only in fact be a “state interest,”
but also, the “state interest” must have a relation to other facts predating the institution of
the policy. In a case of the same year, U.S. v. Virginia, the Court ended gender
discrimination in state higher education, saying, “The justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”20
In its examination of the facts underlying the formation of the “state interest,” the
Court is interested in seeing that the state has maintained important facts. The gist of the
opposition to the Kelo case is that the scrutiny regime allows the state to ignore what is,
in favor of what might be. Justice Kennedy made it clear in his Kelo concurring opinion
that that should not be the result. He says the Court needs to know if, in fact, there is a
government purpose and he says that the Court can only do so after the Court has seen
facts relating to specific criteria:
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A court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties
should [conduct]….a careful and extensive inquiry into ‘whether, in fact, the development plan
[chronology]
[1.] is of primary benefit to . . . the developer…, and private businesses which may eventually
locate in the plan area…,
[2.] and in that regard, only of incidental benefit to the city…[.]’

Kennedy is also interested in facts of the chronology which show, with respect to
government,
[3.] awareness of…depressed economic condition and evidence corroborating the validity of this
concern…,
[4.] the substantial commitment of public funds…before most of the private beneficiaries were
known…,
[5.] evidence that [government] reviewed a variety of development plans…[,]
[6.] [government] chose a private developer from a group of applicants rather than picking out a
particular transferee beforehand and…
[7.] other private beneficiaries of the project [were]…unknown [to government] because
the…space proposed to be built [had] not yet been rented….21

Look at the factual indicia on which there must be civil discovery: plausible,
impermissible, private, benefit, businesses, incidental, depressed, economic, validity,
concern, substantial, commitment, before, review, variety, chose, particular, project,
unknown, space, build. In short, there have to be facts in need of a policy; otherwise, law
is the maintenance of facts, and there is no state interest.
Finally, the Guru Nanak case not so much misread an earlier case, Oregon v.
Smith—a case upholding the scrutiny regime—as it put the seal on the new doctrine that
every law maintains an important fact. This Ninth Circuit case upheld the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, specifically the portion which grants freedom of
religion strict scrutiny where “the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of
a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes,
or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to
make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.”22
RLUIPA, and the decision upholding it in Guru Nanak v. Sutter,23 seemed to be simple
misreadings of Oregon v. Smith.24 But oddly enough, neither counsel nor Court argued
that. This failure is above all a signal that the scrutiny regime has ceased to operate: no
one was even bothering to argue it one way or another.
The Guru Nanak Court said: “We decide that the County made an individualized
assessment of Guru Nanak’s [application for a zoning permit to build a church], thereby
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making RLUIPA applicable, and that the County’s denial of Guru Nanak’s application
constituted a substantial burden, as that phrase is defined by RLUIPA. Because RLUIPA
applies to this case, we address RLUIPA’s constitutionality pursuant to Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and decide that RLUIPA is a congruent and proportional
exercise of congressional power pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.”25 The use of
“individualized assessments” in RLUIPA, assumes—or rather, presumes—that health and
welfare regulation affecting an exercise of religion is a policy of affecting an exercise of
religion. That is not Smith. Smith stood for exactly the opposite proposition, although
the authors of RLUIPA used the terms from Smith in the legislation. The irony of Guru
Nanak is that in the using the Smith decision to uphold RLUIPA, Smith was defeated in
his claim that he was wrongly denied unemployment compensation when he was
dismissed for using peyote for religious purposes. When the Smith Court discussed an
“individualized governmental assessment,” it was referring to “a system of individual
exemptions”26 as a policy, not an effect. When there was such a system, then strict
scrutiny applied when it substantially burdened an exercise of religion. The Court did not
mean that the operation of health and welfare regulations was inherently a “system of
individual exemptions” and that all effects of the policy were to be subject to strict
scrutiny with respect to an exercise of religion. In short, “assessments” are not
synonymous with “exemptions.” Indeed, there was no evidence in Guru Nanak that
Sutter had turned its zoning policy into an effect in order to bar the new church. Even the
church did not contend this, but the Ninth Circuit blithely assumed it. “Individualized
assessment” was conflated with “substantial burden.” The meaning of the conflation was
that the political system (every) had a burden to determine that law did not affect
(maintain) freedom of religion (important).
Should—as seems likely—the Supreme Court uphold Guru Nanak on these
grounds, it will be irrelevant that it is overruling Smith (assuming the case comes up, the
Court will not say that it is overruling Smith, any more than it said it was overruling West
Coast Hotel in Lawrence—indeed, Smith may not come up at all!). That’s not how
things are done in this early stage of the fourth Constitutional epoch. What will be
relevant is that the political system is simply evicting the scrutiny regime. This is
consonant with the view that Constitutional epochs succeed each other simply on the
basis of perceived political needs, and argues for understanding the exploration the fourth
epoch has now undertaken of the indicia of the terms, every, maintain and important.
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